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TAXATION
ESTATE AND INHERITANCE TAXES3 HE effect of inheritance and estate taxes is more far reaching
than a mere exactment of revenue. The desirability of the
limitation that such taxes place upon the pyramiding of wealth
from one generation to another, with its social and economic
consequences, is a matter over which legislatures have differed. At
one time, men of means found it profitable to take their movables
and die in states that had no inheritance tax laws. In 1926, the
Federal Government enacted an estate tax law, designed to remedy
the lack of uniformity between the states by inducing them to
pass uniform inheritance tax laws. This 1926 Revenue Act re-
quired that an estate tax (basic tax) be paid the United States
with the provision that if a decedent's estate paid a similar tax
to a state, credit for such payment might be taken up to 80% of
the amount due the United States.1
In the 1932 Revenue Acte Federal estate taxes were increased
over the basic tax of the 1926 act. These provisions of the Revenue
Act of 1932 were designed primarily as a revenue measure. This
additional tax did not give the taxpayer the privilege of deducting
any similar taxes paid to the states; all revenue therefrom went to
the United States. A detailed discussion of this additional tax is
outside the scope of this article.
The basic provisions of the Texas inheritance tax laws are
found in Chapter 5, Title 122, of the Revised Civil Statutes, and
were enacted in 1923.8 The exemptions allowed vary with the
degree of kinship of the decedent to his beneficiaries-in general,
the closer the kinship the greater the exemption. In some instances
the Texas tax would not be as great as the 80% deduction allowed
'44 STAT. 70 (1926).
2 47 STAT. 243 (1932).
8 TE. Rzv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) Articles 7117-7144.
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by the Federal statute (basic tax). To remedy this and gain full
benefit of the Federal statute, Texas in 1933 enacted what is
popularly called a "take up" statute.' In substance this act pro-
vides that if the amount due Texas under its regular inheritance
tax laws is found to be less than 80% of the amount due the
Federal Government an amount sufficient to exhaust 80% is auto-
matically assessed.
THE PROBLEM OF APPORTIONMENT AND THE TEXAS
"TAKE UP" STATUTE
Until 1942, parties interested in a decedent's estate were in-
different toward the "take up" statute in that it did not increase
the tax burden but merely channelled the full 80% to Texas and
the minimum 20% to the Federal Government. Prior to 1942
when either spouse died only one-half of the community property
was included in decedent's gross estate for both federal and state
tax purposes. In 1942 the federal acts were amended. These
amendments,' as construed and upheld by the United States Su-
preme Court in the case of Fernandez v. Wiener,' subjected all the
community property to the federal estate tax upon the death of
either spouse, except that part which could be shown to be eco-
nomically attributable to the survivor, up to one-half of the entire
community. In 1948 the 1942 amendments were repealed,' effec-
tive January 1, 1948 as to estate taxes, and April 2, 1948 as to
gift taxes. Such repeal was not retroactive except to a limited
extent in the case of estate taxes. So between 1942 and the effective
dates of the 1948 amendments, in almost every instance where the
4 Id., art. 7144a.
5 44 STAr. 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. 1811 (e) (2) (1946 ed.) as amended by 56 STAT.
798 (1942), 26 U. S. C. 1402 (1946 ed.).
6 326 U. S. 340 (1945). This case holds that an estate tax being an excise on the
privilege of transmitting property at death, and not a tax on the property itself, may be
measured by the entire community property on the death of either spouse because of the
resulting enlargement of interest in the survivor.
' 62 STAT. 116 (1948). After the effective date of the 1948 amendments only one half
of the community property will be included in a decedent's estate.
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husband died first, the Federal Government included the entire
community property in his gross estate.' In so far as the Texas
inheritance tax was concerned, theoretically at least, only the
decedent's half was to be included in his gross estate. But since the
federal tax attached to the entire community property, the "take
up" statute in effect made the Texas tax attach to all.
Therefore, in many cases where one-half of a decedent's gross
estate was less than $100,000 it might not be subject to the general
tax laws of Texas. Whereas, according to federal law the dece.
dent's gross estate (because of inclusion of the survivor's interest
in the community property) would be more than $100,000 and
therefore subject to the federal basic tax. The Texas "take up"
statute would then come into operation and make payable to
Texas an amount sufficient to absorb the 80% deduction allowed
by the federal statute. The problem immediately arose as to
whether the "take up" amount payable to Texas because of the
Federal Government's inclusion of the survivor's community prop-
erty interest in decedent's gross estate should be apportioned be-
tween the survivor and decedent or all charged against the dece-
dent's interest. This is still believed to be an open question.
There also exists the problem of apportionment as to that
amount payable to the Federal Government because of the inclu-
sion of the survivor's interest in community property in decedent's
gross estate.' This was also an open question until the Texas Legis-
lature in 1947 enacted article 368.3a" providing for apportion-
8 For the period 1942-1947 inclusive, the commis'ioner as a matter of practice, in.
cluded only one-half of the community in the decedent's estate when it was the wife who
died first, where no part of the community property was economically attributable to the
wife.
'Whether or not apportionment will be allowed is purely a state matter. The United
States has a lien on the whole estate for the federal tax.
"'T.x. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) art. 3683a. "Whenever a Federal
Estate Tax is collected under Section 811 (e) (2) of the United States Internal Revenue
Code, or any corresponding section hereafter enacted by the Congress of the United
States, and such tax is measured in part by the value of the surviving spouse's interest
in community property owned by the decedent, and such surviving spouse at the de-
cedent's death, the executors, administrators, or personal representatives of the decedent,
unless the decedent directs otherwise in his or her will, shall be entitled to recover from
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ment. The federal repeal of the 1942 amendments puts an end
to including the survivor's interest in community property in a
decedent's gross estate and removes the apportionment problem
except for the period between 1942 and the effective date of the
Texas apportionment statute of 1947. For the period between
the effective date of the Texas apportionment statute and the effec-
tive date of the 1948 federal amendments, the Texas statute will
control as to amounts payable to the Federal Government.
In connection with the problem of apportionment, a 1947 opin-
ion of the Texas Attorney General," is of interest. The pertinent
facts before the Attorney General were:
Mr. X died in 1943, leaving a community estate in Texas. The
Federal Government pursuant to the 1926 Revenue Act and the
1942 amendments included in Mr. X's gross estate not only his
half of the community but also the half of his survivor, Mrs. X.
Texas, in assessing its inheritance tax, included in Mr. X's gross
estate only his half of the community property. However, the
"take up" statute came into operation and assessed an additional
amount sufficient to absorb 80% of the full amount of the federal
tax. Mrs. X died in 1945, approximately two years after the
death of Mr. X.
The following question was presented: is the one-half commu-
nity property of Mrs. X subject to the Texas inheritance tax or is
it to be deducted from her gross estate because of Article 13
7125?3 The pertinent provisions of Article 7125 are:
"The only deductions permissible under this law are ... an amount
equal to the value of any property forming a part of the gross estate
the surviving spouse such portion of the total federal estate tax paid under said Sect.
811 (e) (2) as tile net value of the survivor's interest in the community estate included
in the decedent's estate in tile computation of the federal estate tax bears to the net
taxable estate."
It It is the opinion of the writer that the 1947 Texas apportionment statute is not
retroactive. Therefore the right of apportionment as to amounts payable to the federal
government where a decedent's death occurred between January 1, 1942, and the effective
date of said apportionment statute is still an open question.
12 Attorney General Opinion N. V.402, Oct. 8, 1947.
IS TEX. Rix. CIV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) Art. 7125.
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... received from any person who dies within 5 years prior to the death
of the decedent, this reduction, however to be only in the amount of
the value of the property upon which an inheritance tax was actually
paid and shall not include any legal exemptions ......
The Attorney General concluded that the one-half community
property of Mrs. X was not to be deducted and was subject to
the Texas tax. The opinion reasons that the half community prop-
erty of Mrs. X was never a part of Mr. X's gross estate as far as
Texas law was concerned and had not previously been legally
subjected to the state inheritance tax, notwithstanding that when
Mr. X died, the Texas "take up" statute was invoked to consume
the 80% of the amount assessed by the Federal Government on
the entire community property.
From this reasoning it would be logical to infer that for the
period 1942 until the effective date of the 1948 federal amend-
ments, apportionment will not be allowed of the amount payable
to Texas and attributable to the survivor's interest in the commu-
nity property and the "take up" statute; the entire tax burden will
fall on the decedent's interest in the estate.
In Simco v. Shirk"4 the Supreme Court of Texas held that other
states cannot through their taxing policies defeat the power of
Texas to levy a tax sufficient to absorb the full 80% of the basic
tax levied by the Federal Government upon property located in
Texas, notwithstanding Section 8 of the "take up" statute.15
The facts of the case are as follows: A taxpayer living in state
A died in state A. His gross estate was located in state A, statp B
and Texas. All was taxed by the Federal Government under the
provisions of the 1926 Revenue Act. States A and B levied taxes
to consume not only 80% of the federal tax attributable to prop-
erty located in states A and B but also to consume 75% of the
federal tax attributable to property located in Texas. The property
located in Texas is exempt by the regular state inheritance tax law.
The question for decision was whether Texas under the "take
24 200 S. W. (2d) 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
18 Tsi. REv. Civ. STAT. AN. (Vernon's, 1925) Art. 7144a, I 8.
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up" statute could assess an inheritance tax in an amount sufficient
to absorb 80% of that amount levied by the Federal Government
and attributable to property located in Texas? Or should Texas
be limited to 5%, the amount of the allowable unused by states
A and B?
The Texas Supreme Court reversing the Court of Civil Ap.
peals,1" held that the entire 80% was taxable and not merely
the 5%.
Sections 4 and 5 of Article 7144a make provision for assess-
ment of the full 80% by Texas on estates located in or partly
outside of Texas and not taxable by the regular inheritance tax
laws of Texas.
Section 8 of Article 714 4a which was relied upon by the tax-
payer as the basis for his contention that he should be given
credit by Texas for the 75% paid to states A and B and that
only the unused 5% was taxable by Texas, refers to sections 1-7
inclusive of Article 7144a which states in part:
"... this Chapter shall aways be construed so as not to increase the
total amount of taxes payable to the State and Federal Government
combined upon the estates of decedents, the only purpose of said addi-
tional tax being to take full advantage of the 80% credit allowed by
the Federal Revenue Act of 1920. . ..
The court construed the word "State" in the above section to
mean Texas only. By this, any amounts paid to other states are
excluded in considering whether the Texas tax violates Section 8
by increasing the total amount of taxes payable to the State and
Federal Government combined upon the estates of decedents.
If states A and B choose to charge rates that exhaust more than
80% of the amount of the federal tax assessed against property
located in states A and B, it is no concern of Texas. However,
such payment to A and B cannot be used as an offset to the right
of Texas to a full payment of 80% of the amount of the federal
tax attributable to property located in Texas.
[Vol. 2
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FR&cHisE TA---No PAR STOCK
Par value stock of a corporation is included at its par value,
whether paid in or not, in computing the Texas franchise tax.
As to no par stock, a different rule obtains. Involving this
problem is the 1947 case of Sterling Oil and Refining Corp. v.
Isbell, et al." The corporation was organized in 1933 with a capi-
tal stock of $100 divided into 10 shares of a par value of $10
each. In the same year the charter was amended changing the
capital structure to 80 shares at a par value of $1.25 each, the
total legal capital remaining at $100. In 1934 the board of direc-
tors, in securing a charter amendment to authorize an issue of
80,000 shares of no par value stock, filed a sworn statement that
the value of the 80 shares is $1,033,181.25. At a time when the
80 shares of par stock had an appraised or represented value of
$1,033,181.25 as against a book value of $100.00, the corpora-
tion issued 40,000 of its no par stock to its share holders in ex-
change for their 80 shares of par stock.
The question in the case was whether $100 or $1,033,181.25
was the amount subject to the franchise tax.
Art 7084 provides:
"For the purpose of computing the tax of corporations issuing no
par stock, such stock shall be taken and considered as being of the value
actually received at the time of issue thereof .... 1
After considering the above article the court held that the
$1,033,181.25 represented value of the 80 shares and that that
amount and not the $100 book value was the value actually re-
ceived at the time of the issue of the 40,000 shares of no par
stock, and, therefore, was the amount to be included in computing
the franchise tax.
After this case, the State auditor requested an opinion from
the Attorney General as to whether the amount actually paid in
for shares of capital stock of non-par corporations is the amount
16 202 S. W. (2d) 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
IT T REV. Civ. STAT. ANx. (Vernon's, 1925) Art. 7084.
1948]
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of capital stock on which the franchise tax should be based or
whether the amount should be based on the entire amount author-
ized after ascertaining the value of the unissued stock.
In Opinion No. V-341 dated August 14, 1947 the Attorney Gen-
eral replied:
"In computing the franchise tax due by corporations whose capital
stock has no nominal or par value, only the amount that has actually
been paid in, which does not always represent the total number of
shares authorized by the charter, is used as the amount of capital stock
for such tax purposes and no tax is assessed on that portion of the
authorized capital stock that has not been paid in .... "
The Sterling case was cited by the Attorney General in support
of his opinion. In that case, after 40,000 shares of non-par stock
had been exchanged for 80 shares of outstanding par stock, most
of the remaining 40,000 shares were sold to the public at $25 per
share. The corporation paid a franchise tax on the number thus
sold and not on the unissued shares. This action was upheld by
the court.
FORECLOSURE OF TAx LIENS AND THE PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION;
THE LAW BEFORE AND AFTER JUNE 23, 1947
In 1947 Texas law as to when the redemption period begins in
the case of a judgment foreclosure and tax sale was changed by
an amendment to Article 7345b Section 12,9 effective June 23,
1947.
This amendment has been construed by the Attorney General
as follows:
"In tax suits not reduced to judgment prior to June 23, 1947, the
effective date of the amendment to Sect. 12 ... the redemption period
1s Attorney General Opinion No. V.341, Aug. 14, 1947.
19 TEr. Rav. Cn'. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) Art. 7345b as amended: "In all suits
heretofore or hereafter filed to collect delinquent taxes against property, judgment in
said suit shall provide for the issuance of writ of possession within 20 days after the
period of redemption shall have expired to the purchaser at foreclosure sale .. .; but
whenever land is sold tinder judgment in such suit for taxes, the owner of such property,
or anyone having an interest therein, . . . may, within 2 years from the date of the filing
for record of the purchaser's deed and not thereafter, have the right to redeem...."
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begins from the date of the recording of the purchaser's deed. In tax
suits reduced to judgment prior to June 23, 1947, the effective date of
the amendment, the redemption period runs from the date of sale."2 0
Garcia v. Aycock," construes the statute of limitations on the
right of redemption, as it existed prior to June 23, 1947. In this
case land was sold November 3, 1942, to the county after a
judicial foreclosure of a tax lien. The sheriff's deed to the county
was not filed until three years later. Article 7345b Section 12'
provided for the privilege of redemption within two years of the
date of sale. The delinquent taxpayer contended that his right of
redemption could not be limited to two years from the date of sale
because Article 8 Section 13 of the Texas Constitution allows two
years from the date of recording of the deed.
.The court rejected this contention pointing out that the consti-
tutional provision applies only to summary proceedings and does
not effect the limitation on the period of redemption as imposed
by statute which applies to a sale pursuant to a foreclosure pro-
ceeding in court. Therefore the date of the sale and not the date
of the filing of the sheriff's deed starts the two-year period of
limitation. By this test the taxpayer was barred from redemption
by limitations.
C.S.
20 Attorney General Opinion No. V-362, Aug. 27, 1947.
21203 S. W. (2d) 982 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
22Tci. Ray. Ctv. STAT. AiN. (Vernon's, 1925) Art. 7345b, 1 12.
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